——为谭作人先生而作

艾未未与他的同伴搜寻地震中遇难学生名单，《南方人物周刊》作了报道。这是他的同事打给某重灾县维稳小组组长的一段电话录音：

 　“我们刚才电话没讲完你就挂掉了。”

“你这么关心这个事情呀？你们有什么目的呀？”

“我们没有什么目的呀。”

“没有目的干嘛关心呀？”

“我们为什么不可以关心，这是中国人的事情呀。”

“我也是中国人呀！你要是美国人派来的特务呢？你要是美国人派来的间谍，怎么办？”

 “……”。

“既然我们政府部门已经公布了，那就可以了，你还要问，我就怀疑了，我要维护国家利益呀！”

“我们都在维护国家利益呀！但是国家也需要维护人民的利益呀。”

“是，那就是政府的事了，你不需要管这个事。”

“我们是公民呀，我们想要求你们负起责任来呀！”

“你怎么知道我们没负责？你凭什么这样说？有必要把话说得这么难听吗？”

“这不是难不难听，这是事实呀！”

“你说是事实？我直接就怀疑你就是美国方面派来的女特务！”

读到其中“美国人派来的间谍”时，不觉哑然失笑。此公仿佛意犹未尽，进一步发挥成“美国方面派来的女特务”，他的意思也许是一定要让人笑翻，笑到岔气。为什么中国人关心中国人自己的事情，会被理解成由美国方面派来的呢？这是一种有根据的思路、负责任的说话方式吗？

这也许是最为厉害的一手：只要将某人说成是“异族”派来的，受“异族”指使，便会使这个人立马失去了任何立足点，成为众矢之的。只是这种做法在如今看来有 些老套了，不新鲜因而也失去了可信度。而这位维稳小组组长因为这句话，会使他“彪炳千秋”的，会比他所做的其他事情被人们永远记住。

然而问题是：为什么这些在体制内拥有某个或大或小席位的人们，总是习惯用这样一些完全不信任的眼光看待别人？为什么他们在公民的行为面前，表现得如此困惑 和不理解，觉得不可思议？他们为什么会觉得来自任何“对面”、“对方”（不是用一根电话绳连起来的内部）的声音，都是富有敌意的、觉得那是一个威胁？

尝试的解释是这样的：这些人本身已经失去了任何自发的道德感和责任心，他们自己不拥有这些东西，于是他们也不会想象别人身上可能拥有这种东西。他们不能够体验自己身上任何美好的思想感情，实际上根本不拥有这些美好的思想感情，彻底丧失了这些东西，于是只能用一种妖魔化的眼光来看待他人。

这里尤其需要强调“自发”二字。它是指一个人面对同胞受难时，面对幼小的孩子受苦时，面对废墟下冰凉的小身体、面对成堆的书包唤不回小主人时，自然会涌起 的那种自然、自发的人类感情——同情、怜悯、悲伤、痛心，这是不需要人来指导就会产生的天然反映，是中国人源远流长的“物伤其类”、“天地良心”的那样一 种情感，也是一个人“人之为人”的基本体现。就像艾未未所说的：“我们可以回避这些血和肉，这些声音，这些气味吗？”

然而就有这样一些人，他们完全丧失了所有“自发”的东西，丧失了属于人的基本反映，他们不能理解在“人”的范围之内、在“人”身上发生的一切，不能理解作 为“一个人”而采取的立场和行动，这件事情真是奇怪。这些人身居体制久矣，他们只会按照体制发出的指令来行事，只能用体制内部的眼光来看待这个世界和我们 的社会。

这些人如何才能够想象得到，在一些从来也没有见过面的人们身上，在远离他们权力机关的地方，有另外许多人们，他们逐渐觉得事情不能再这样继续下去了，于是 他们先后开始去做一个真正的人，而不是体制的动物，他们开始按照自己的良知和道德感办事，按照他们内心的做人原则去行动，他们恢复了和实践着作为一个人， 对于我们同胞、我们社会、我们民族未来的责任感，这些也是一个正常的人所需要具备的。他们的努力，增添了这个世界上“善的总和”。而恰恰是这些，成为那些 眼中只有自己的私利、而没有任何道德感和责任心人们最不能忍受的。

令这些“体制内的冷血动物”更加不可理解的是，这些依据自发感情和良心而行动的人们，他们在遇到巨大阻力之时，在遭到骚扰恐吓之后，甚至在人身安全受到威 胁、面临失去自由的前夕，却并不因此而退缩却步，而是一如既往地前行，继续做自己认为应该做的事情。看上去他们这是在拿“鸡蛋碰石头”，明显得不到任何好 处，没有任何看得见的结果，但仿佛他们并不在乎这些，并不在乎自己所受的任何委屈和不公平对待，他们受自己内心中的正义原则所引导。

我这样说的时候，心里特别想着的是四川谭作人先生。这位多年的环保工作者，曾经不止一次参与过当地公民公益活动，为此受到有关方面的“反复警告”(见肖雪 慧文)。地震之后，他与朋友们在第一时间抵达极重灾区，尽力给灾民送去物资，同时展开倒塌的校舍以及学生死亡人数的调查。他的那篇“川震百日祭”有这样的 题记——“愿把有罪的我，献给无罪的你——献给5•12大地震罹难的孩子们”，如此恳切如此承担责任，这样的人在中国古代，应该被称为“义人”，他的举动 当称为“义举”。但是这位大义人，在3月28日这天，却被警方带走迄今未回。肖雪慧写文章发问道：“‘垫付罪’，你信吗？”肖雪慧本人也是一位四川奇女 子，真难为她发明“垫付罪”这样的新词。

我不信，坚决不相信。我不相信这位两个孩子的父亲，会做出伤害自己的同胞、伤害我们社会的任何事情！任何人从这篇情深意切的《川震百日祭：追踪北川的天灾 人祸》中，都可以得出自己的结论！我本人没有见过谭作人先生，但是谭先生被捕之前，我正好从艾晓明初剪出来的新纪录片当中，见到了这位一脸沧桑的汉子。他 明确谈到自己面临的危险，谈到在他之前，已经有六四天网的黄琦，“为了学生家长的维权，被抓了”；然后是广汉中学的刘绍坤老师，“因为给成都读书会，介绍 北川中学的老师，来讲他们的这种情况，也被公安机关抓了。”接着他说，“别人说好事不过三，我就算第三个吧”。他面对艾晓明的镜头所说的这些话，令人肃然 起敬：

我做好了足够的思想准备

在这样一个世界大灾难面前

如果没有人出来说话

大家都是缩头乌龟的话

我想 这三年五年

我跟大家不见面好一点

不在这个世上

我在另外一个社会中

等到以后

大家对这个事情有了更深刻的反省

知道做人应该怎么做

特别是做中国人

特别困难地做中国人

怎么这样

北川大地震牺牲的这么多人

为这个事情被判刑

付出生命中几年的时间

这样的代价

我觉得是值得的

这样的人才是我们民族的脊梁，是我们民族的盐和钙质，是我们民族道德重建的基石、社会重建的出发点。将这样的人加以囚禁，等于直接囚禁我们民族的良心！

                                        2009年4月9日 

This little piece really made me understand a lot better what's going on in the world in the past few years. A number of awesome quotes. Her defense of the Bush team was quite refreshing--wait a minute, did I say that word? Well you know what I meant...

Welcome to My World, Barack

Nathan Fox

What the World Needs Now Is . . . Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice contemplates the state of the world — past, present and future.

On Jan. 20, Barack Obama will inherit a world very different from the one his predecessor found in January 2001. Over the past eight years, the Bush administration has faced great challenges and nurtured grand ambitions; it has tried hard to remake the world. Condoleezza Rice has been a central player in that effort since becoming the candidate Bush’s chief foreign-policy adviser in 2000, so we arranged to interview her at the State Department late last month. The interview turned into a wide-ranging discussion of where this government has taken the United States and what sort of world it will leave for the next president. The editors have culled the highlights of her remarks in the text that follows. We also spoke with other administration foreign-policy makers — Christopher Hill and Daniel Fried of the State Department and Gen. James L. Jones, former supreme allied commander, Europe — whose remarks supplement and illuminate those of Rice.

I. OUR ELECTION, AND THEIRS

WHAT THE ELECTION THAT HE WON MEANS.
Electing a black president says around the world that you can overcome old wounds. I’ve said in our case, We have a birth defect, but it can be overcome.

WHAT THE ELECTION THAT HE WON MEANS.
I’ve heard people commenting on how in this election, in far places, people talk about what is a caucus and how does that differ from a primary. I think that links up with the fact that the United States under this president has been more active and more insistent that democracy is not just something for a few. People are watching, and I think they’re trying to learn from democratic experience.

WHAT ALL THOSE ELECTIONS IN IRAQ AND UKRAINE AND LEBANON MEANT.
It’s not that you deliver on it tomorrow. Maybe 2005 was a bit deceptive in that way because you had the Iraqi elections, the Cedar Revolution, the Orange Revolution, the Rose Revolution and the Palestinian election. (1) So maybe people came to expect too much too soon.

WHAT ELECTIONS COULD MEAN FOR PEOPLE WHO DON’T TEND TO HAVE THEM.
I’ve seen too many peoples dismissed as not ready for self-government. First it was Asians, and then Latin Americans and Africans were there for a while. I know for a while black Americans were, too.

I’ve seen it said, well, you know: They’re illiterate; how could they vote? And then you see in Afghanistan people line up for long, long lines. Because somehow they know that making a choice matters.

WHAT AMERICAN PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY CAN DO.
I think that over the last several years, because of a more assertive American voice on this, there have been some real gains — like women in Kuwait voting or like Iraq, which is an imperfect and fragile and still-emerging democracy but one that is multiconfessional, multiethnic and in the center of the Arab world.

AND WHY AMERICA SHOULD NOT STOP PROMOTING IT.
If the U.S. doesn’t remain that lodestar, then I think democracy moves off the international agenda at a time when you’re beginning to see, for instance, the Europeans unafraid to give their award to a Chinese dissident,(2) despite the blowback from Beijing. The Egyptians know that their next election is going to be an important transitional election. I think they’re going to insist on a different kind of election.

WHAT AMERICA DOESN’T UNDERSTAND ABOUT DEMOCRACY.
It’s not easy for a country to embrace the chaos of democracy. It’s especially not easy because people who try to introduce democratic reforms are often people who have to bear the responsibilities but also the consequences when sometimes things don’t go well. So one should be careful about giving advice and not having to deal with the consequences of that advice. . . . I have no doubt that democracy is the best form of government. I’m very optimistic that it is one whose reach is increasing throughout the world. I would just urge all Americans to understand how our advice is taken. And to be careful how we offer advice. For many people in the world, they look at America, and they see an enormous country with an extraordinary amount of power. Pure power. And so they feel that asymmetry immediately as soon as they meet us. So we have to understand how people look at us sometimes. So advice coming from a country with enormous power can be taken wrongly. CHRISTOPHER HILL
Christopher Hill is the assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs. Since February 2005, he has been lead negotiator on talks with North Korea aimed at ending its nuclear program.

II. SUPERPOWERS PAST, SUPERPOWERS FUTURE

THE PROBLEM RUSSIA HAS.
They’ve got problems, and the basis of this is that the legitimacy of the Russian government is not ideology; it is not a pretension to a different route for human development as Communism was. It is the ability of Russians to, if they can’t afford those Cartier shops near Tverskaya, to be able instead to go to the Ikea store that now completely dominates the Tank Trap Monument that celebrates the repulsion of the final push of the Germans into Moscow.(3)

THE BIGGER PROBLEM RUSSIA HAS.
Russia has an aging population that’s not being replaced and unfortunately a sickly population, and an economy that did not take advantage of higher oil prices to diversify. It’s still an infrastructural nightmare if you get outside of major cities and certainly if you start going toward the Far East. So I think we should be calm.

RUSSIA AND US — THE MORAL DIFFERENCE.
The West does not go out and conquer countries by using force, try to deprive countries of a choice. It didn’t insist that Poland join NATO. Poland wanted to join NATO. It didn’t impose NATO membership or E.U. membership on Estonia; Estonia chose it. That’s a difference, and it’s a moral difference as well. . . . If you validate the assumptions of Russians who believe that the only proper relationship between Russia and its neighbors is one of subordination and intimidation, then how do you expect a more cooperative Russia to emerge in the future? The United States has learned that it is in our interest that our neighbors, Mexico for example, be prosperous, successful and free. And Russia needs to develop a normal set of relations with its neighbors. The notions of privileged relations or its sphere of influence . . . which the Russians demand is not the formula for greater stability; it’s the formula for greater tension. I’m not stating these things as a fiat; I’m suggesting that the next administration will have to think this through. DANIEL FRIED
Daniel Fried is the assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs.

SOMETIMES EUROPEANS ALSO COME FROM MARS.
I remember telling my European colleagues that I know they always think that America is going to be more aggressive on fighting extremism than they. But you know, we could never, within our context, have passed the law like the basic incitement laws that the British have passed.(4)

The first amendment would have prohibited it.

HOW WE CAN HOLD THE WEST TOGETHER.
I remember when I went to Europe, I said — you know, this is in the wake of 2003-4, which was tough on the alliance — and I said: “Can we take the trans-Atlantic relationship off the sofa? And stop analyzing it and analyzing whether it’s healthy, and actually put it to work in common causes?” Because we all share the same interests and, by that time, we even shared an interest in a stable Iraq. There is only one process in the Middle East; it’s the Annapolis process, (5) and it’s got Arab support and international support from all of our European friends.

HOW BUSH DID HOLD THE WEST TOGETHER.
It’s a myth that we have poor relations with the Europeans. We have excellent relations with all European states at this point. Now, it may be that we still have some disagreements, but even on something like how to fight terrorists, I think there’s a growing recognition that this isn’t just law enforcement and that it puts difficult questions on the agenda about the relationship of gathering information to civil liberties and so forth.

WHY THE EUROPEANS WILL MISS BUSH.
An Obama presidency will be greeted in Europe with enthusiasm, but as some Europeans have put it to me, “We realize that we won’t have the excuse of George Bush.” Obama made it clear during his trip to Europe that he wants to work with Europe, but any American president is going to think globally, and Obama, from what I know of his team, is a freedom Democrat. He believes in a values-based foreign policy. He’s going to want Europe to stand up and do more. . . . And Europeans will have a problem, in that they will embrace him, and they will not be able to say: “Well, this is the Bush administration. We have to resist.” DANIEL FRIED

III. HOW WE USE POWER

WHERE “NEVER AGAIN” NEVER QUITE GOT DONE.
I have regrets about Darfur, real regrets. I don’t know that there were other answers. The president considered trying to do something unilaterally — very difficult to do.

THERE WILL ALWAYS BE DICTATORS.
The United States is not an N.G.O., so it’s not as if we throw out every other interest or every other concern with a country because it’s authoritarian. And sometimes we aren’t able to effect change as completely as we like. It has to be indigenous change.

TO WARD OFF NEW DICTATORS, YOU NEED TO WORK.
We’ve gone a long way to make foreign assistance a partnership. We’ve gone a long way to make foreign assistance have accountability on both sides. Developed countries deliver, but developing countries have to deliver for their people, and you can’t ask new democratic states or fragile democratic states to be democratic and to be accountable to their people and not help them have the resources to do it.

WHAT WE ASK OF OTHER STATES.
The innovation in Latin America that I think has gone largely unnoticed is when the president went to Brazil and he said: We have no litmus test for our friendship. The only question is, Do you govern democratically, do you invest in your people, do you fight corruption? And so our best friends in Latin America include Colombia from the right and Brazil from the left. Chile from the left; Uruguay from the left.

WHY WE MAY BE LOSING IN AFGHANISTAN.
I think the first thing the next president will have to do is understand that Afghanistan is now part of a regional problem. Maybe four or five years ago it was about Afghanistan, but now it’s about Afghanistan and Pakistan, and you can’t deal with one without dealing with the other. So there is a regional aspect to this that I think we have to deal with. Secondly, I think it’s important for people to understand that Afghanistan is an international problem. It’s not a U.S. problem alone, as opposed to Iraq. . . . The U.N. is there; NATO is there; the E.U. is there; the World Bank is there; all the N.G.O.’s in the world; around 50 countries. So the question is with all of this capability there, why do we have the sense that we’re backsliding? The top of my list is the drugs and narcotics, which are, without question, the economic engine that fuels the resurgent Taliban, and the crime and corruption in the country. . . . We couldn’t even talk about that in 2006 when I was there. That was not a topic that anybody wanted to talk about, including the U.S. JAMES L. JONES Gen. James L. Jones has served as commandant of the Marine Corps, supreme allied commander in Europe and head of the U.S. military’s European Command. He was named a special envoy for Middle East security last year by Condoleezza Rice.

WHY FREE TRADE WILL COME UNDER ATTACK.
Mexico has benefited from Nafta. In the current global financial crisis, of course, a lot of people are going to be questioning free trade and international integration and all of those things. . . . Yes, the financial system clearly got out of kilter, and Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson and the president and Congress are dealing with that. But it shouldn’t go to the core principles of markets, the importance of open trade, the fact of globalization — which is not going to go backwards.

IV. THE MIDDLE EAST AND BEYOND

HOW WE CHANGED THE CONVERSATION.
There have been some real gains, but there also has been a complete change in the conversation, particularly in the Middle East, where some form of popular legitimacy is being sought in almost every country. The American voice has got to stay strong in that conversation.

HOW TO MOVE THE CONVERSATION FORWARD.
I really think we have the best atmosphere between Palestinians and Israelis since the mid-’90s, so I’m very gratified that that has come into place. The Palestinian leadership is avowedly in favor of negotiations, renounces violence, recognizes the right of Israel to exist. There is a robust negotiating process, and they have made a lot of progress on how to get to a two-state solution. There is now broad Israeli acceptance of the need for a Palestinian state. After all, Kadima came out of Likud (6) with that in mind. And we have a process on the ground that is beginning to make some progress in terms of making life better for people who live on the West Bank. Palestinian security forces are becoming competent enough that they’re now about to move into Nablus, one of the toughest areas, with Israeli consent.

WHY SPEED IS ESSENTIAL TO DEALING WITH HAMAS.
The Hamas takeover of Gaza is a problem, but thanks to good Egyptian work, at least there is calm for now. One reason to try and get an agreement done pretty quickly is that I think Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas needs to be able to take an agreement to the Palestinian people through either referendum or elections in order to sideline Hamas politically or to have Hamas buy in, which I think is unlikely, or to sideline Hamas by demonstrating that they don’t have a solution for the Palestinian problem. So that’s another reason to do it quickly. But I think the structure is there, I think the Annapolis structure is a very powerful structure . . . On the Palestinian-Israeli issue, we will leave this in a much, much better place, agreement or no.

HOW TO CHANGE A REGIME — SLOWLY.
We have said to Iran that this is about changing your regime’s behavior, not changing your regime. That has been the message all along. Would we hope that the Iranian people . . . do they deserve to have a different regime than they’ve got? Absolutely. But the way that we have tried to help with democracy in Iran is to help indigenous forces there — to bring everyone from people who do disaster relief to artists to sending our wrestlers there. You know, it’s why the question of an interests section continues to be important to us.(7)

FINDING PRO-AMERICANISM IN IRAN.
There’s a very pro-American feeling among most Iranians not because of our policies but because of who we are and because we have stood for democracy. Iranians are sophisticated people — that’s a sophisticated and great culture — and we need to be able to reach out to them. But in terms of dealing with the regime, I think we’ve made it very, very clear that we’re prepared to deal with the regime; we just don’t want them to use negotiations as a cover while they improve their nuclear-weapons capability.

V. TWILIGHT OF THE INSTITUTIONS?

DISCOVERING WHETHER THE “RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT” MEANS ANYTHING.
I think we thought the Responsibility to Protect meant something.(8) I remember when the responsibility-to-protect language came up at the 2006 United Nations General Assembly, and I remember thinking at the time: If this turns out to be nothing but words, the Security Council is going to have a real black eye, and in the Darfur case it has turned out to be nothing but words. I think it has been an enormous embarrassment for the Security Council and for multilateral diplomacy.

DON’T PREACH TO THE CHINESE.
I think if we do find a solution to the problem of Darfur, it will be because we worked with China. If we find a solution to the problem of Iran, it will be because we worked well with China. Similarly, if we close this deal with North Korea, it will be because of our efforts with China. So I think China has emerged as a country with whom we have to work globally on security challenges. There are increasing signs that we can do that. China suffers at times to an extent, I think, from a caricature of what it is. It’s a really complex society. I don’t think it should be defined by one dimension, its economics, or security, or human rights. We need to look at all the issues. CHRISTOPHER HILL

WHY THE SECURITY COUNCIL NEGLECTED DARFUR.
We worked day in and day out. Almost not a day passes in this office that we’re not trying to find some way to get more forces into Darfur. To make the Sudanese government live up to the multiple agreements that it has made and then walked away from. We go to the Security Council, and nobody wants there to be consequences, well, not nobody, sorry, some don’t wish there to be consequences. And so we end up sanctioning again, unilaterally. The Europeans do some things but other interests seem to then trump the responsibility to protect.

HOW NATO REALLY WORKS.
First of all, the NATO alliance took on this mission in Afghanistan by consensus. It only operates by consensus. And I think what you see is steadily increasing alliance participation. The French have increased their numbers; most of the small states have increased their numbers over time.

AN ALLIANCE OF DEMOCRACIES IS NEVER SIMPLE.
There’s this past image of NATO as in total, complete unity with exactly the same views during the cold war. Simply fiction. Fiction. Do you remember that in 1989 the big NATO 40th-anniversary summit was going to see a breakdown around short-range nuclear forces being deployed? So, NATO has always been an alliance of democracies. . . . Yes, I’d like to see NATO do more. Yes, we push hard for NATO to do more. Yes, we don’t like the caveats,(9) and some of them have come off in time. But you look at what this alliance is doing; it’s impressive.

WHAT NATO IS STILL GOOD FOR.
I think if NATO members draw the conclusion that they shouldn’t have been here in Afghanistan, and we’re not going to do this again, then I think the purpose of NATO in the 21st century will very quickly be called into question. I think that most of them do understand that for NATO to survive as an institution in the 21st century, they need to start thinking about a new strategic concept. . . . Unfortunately NATO’s mission is still rooted in the 20th-century, cold-war model of a defensive, static, reactive alliance instead of agile, flexible and proactive 21st-century reality. JAMES L. JONES

HOW NATO MIGHT HAVE WORKED AFTER 9/11, BUT DIDN’T. If there is one thing that was unfortunate about 9/11, about the aftermath, I remember when the alliance invoked Article 5, first time it had ever happened, and we simply couldn’t wait for the alliance to mobilize.(10) And, had you had the ability to mobilize the alliance the way we have now, there probably would have been more buy-in. But that’s one of those — it was impossible to do. Capabilities just weren’t there. Later on we got the rapid reaction force and all the things that we needed.

VI. THE PAST AND FUTURE OF THE BUSH AGENDA

WHY BUSH SET THE FREEDOM AGENDA.
George W. Bush deserves credit for recognizing that the terms were now going to be set for the next big historical evolution. The president recognized that freedom was something that was not just desirable but essential for the United States; that it meant not just freedom from tyranny but also freedom from disease, from poverty. And that if you were going to have democratic leaders, they had to be able to deliver for their people. Thus the president supported the millennium challenge and the H.I.V. AIDS and Malaria project.(11) And linking up the great compassion of the United States with our security interests. Making it about democracy, defense and development. We’re at the beginning of that historical transformation, and yes, sometimes it’s lonelier at the beginning than at the end.

It’s really recognizing that this is about a single answer to what is the right form of government, and that’s democracy. It takes different forms: there is Japanese democracy, and there’s American democracy, and there are fragile democracies, and there are emerging democracies, and there are states that are trying to find some form of popular legitimacy.

IMMIGRATION POLICY IS FOREIGN POLICY.
We didn’t get comprehensive immigration reform. . . . I think everybody knows that this president tried. I remember the first foreign-policy meeting that I went to with the then-governor, before he was inaugurated, was with the then-governor, soon to be president of Mexico, Vicente Fox, and they talked about the need to fix this problem. I am a firm believer in defending our laws and defending our borders. . . . But it’s also true that there are a lot of hardworking people in this country who live in the shadows.

IMMIGRANTS ARE CENTRAL TO AMERICAN IDENTITY.
I was a major proponent of the temporary-worker program and finding some way to normalize the status for these people. I think that it goes to the core of who we are. I hear some people talking about, well, maybe there should be a timeout on legal immigration, check your last name and see whether or not it came over on the Mayflower.

WHY SOME IMMIGRANTS SHOULD STAY — AND SOME SHOULD STAY HOME.
Improving the economic conditions that would allow people who are clearly ambitious — if they’re going to walk across the desert to get here, they’re ambitious people — improving the capability of those people to stay home and contribute is the last piece of that puzzle. Comprehensive immigration reform is the one thing I wish we’d been able to do, and it’s going to have to be done, and I hope it’s done soon.

WHAT SHOULD NOT BE ABANDONED.
The other thing that I’m worried about out of this current global financial crisis and whatever economic fallout there may be is, I really hope we don’t sacrifice foreign assistance. The Millennium Challenge and programs like it say: invest in your people, fight corruption, be democratic, and we’ll help you. If you can’t fulfill that promise, then good governments around the world that have staked their futures on that argument are going to be in very deep trouble. And so I hope that foreign assistance, if anything, continues to increase. We found it flat. The president doubled it in Latin America, quadrupled it in Africa, tripled it worldwide. The president authorized 300 new U.S. AID officers and 1,100 new Foreign Service officers, because we believe that transformational diplomacy is a word for not thinking that your job as a diplomat is to sit in the capital and talk to other governments. It’s to get out and help those governments. Without the tools of foreign assistance, we won’t be able to do it.

WHAT THE MOST POWERFUL MAN IN THE WORLD CAN’T ACCOMPLISH.
Do you think Bush expected 9/11? No. Did Clinton expect Bosnia? No. Man makes his plans; God has his own. . . . Remember Bush’s second debate with Gore where he campaigned against nation building? Oh, well. . . . The tension between the modesty of knowing what’s possible and what isn’t, and the desire and ability to do good because you’re president of the United States, that challenge is one of the most profound things. . . . Don’t shortchange the opportunity to make a difference, but understand how hard it is. . . . You’ve got to keep both notions in your head at the same time. And that’s hard. That’s the description for the man in the Oval Office. DANIEL FRIED

Helene Cooper is diplomatic correspondent for The Times and author of “The House on Sugar Beach.” Scott L. Malcomson is an editor of the magazine and author, most recently, of “One Drop of Blood: The American Misadventure of Race.” Interviews with Christopher Hill and Daniel Fried were done by Helene Cooper; the interviews with Condoleezza Rice and James L. Jones were done by Cooper and Malcomson. All the interviews took place in late October in Washington.

长平事件：论中产阶级与政治领导权

徐晓宏

2008年4日，在藏独事件引发的振荡正处于顶峰的时刻，《南方都市报》副总编辑长平发表了以《西藏：真相与民族主义情绪》的文章，借机再次提出了新闻自由的诉求。然而，该文所引起的效应，非但不是作者所期待的人们对于新闻自由这一诉求的支持，而是排山倒海式的批评和愤怒。长平先生大概现在还在纳闷为什么自己的发言会这么失败，抑或正在哀叹中国人是多么的不可救药。

然而，这一事件也集中暴露了中国新兴中产阶级的政治幼稚和中国民主化的政治困境。长平先生恐怕所不能理解的是，他的文章所激怒人们的，并不是他的新闻自由的主张，而是他对于民众情绪的否定，他那种教训民众的态度，和启蒙先知式的口吻。

九十年代以来，中国的自由主义知识分子们似乎养成了一种习惯性的思维，就是对于“民族主义情绪”的担忧和敌视。这样的担忧和敌视，当然有一定的理由。自由主义一般推崇独立的政治判断的价值，因此总担心这样独立的判断被多数人的情绪所淹没。

中国知识分子对于民族主义情绪的恐惧，并不是在真空中发生的。它的国际背景，是晚近几十年来西方知识分子对于民族主义的批判和抛弃。这一批判和抛弃的原因非常复杂，其中一个重要的原因，就是西方知识生产领域的跨国流动急剧增加，使得西方主流知识分子在体制上依赖一种世界主义的政治视角。但即便如此，他们一般也是在学院里面以学术研究的语言对民众的民族主义情绪进行委婉的质疑，像长平先生那样在报纸上以教训民众的口吻公开攻击“民族主义情绪”的事情，几乎无法想象。而长平先生的这一现象，很大程度上来自于中国传统知识分子做老百姓的启蒙老师的士大夫习惯姿态。

然而，民族主义情绪真的那么可怕吗？民族主义真的与自由民主不可调和吗？事实上，如果我们回顾历史，民族主义和自由民主恰恰是两个如影如随的现象。英国——现代政治自由的故乡——从17世纪到19世纪几乎每一次的政治进步，都是与排外的民族主义情绪交错在一起。光荣革命被当时的人们理解为把英国从罗马天主教的魔爪和法国的威胁中解放出来的革命，尽管事实上它是以荷兰执政者威廉三世入侵英国的形式登场的。直到1832年的民主改革，都是与人们对法国暴民政治会危害英国政治稳定的恐慌分不开的（英国人这种排外式的恐慌，在最近的伦敦奥运火炬传递中关于“中国流氓来了”的非理性的情绪中再一次得到了令人捧腹的展现，参见Brendan O’Neill对此精彩的讽喻：http://www.spiked-online.com/index.php?/site/article/4963/）。同样的，法国大革命尽管表面上看上去是人们对于君主专制的反抗，但这是与当时的革命者认为国王政府没有能力以法兰西民族的名义应对英国挑战的情绪纠集在一起的。在过去的十几年中，台独民族主义与台湾民主化难解难分的关系，不过是扎扎实实发生在我们眼前的对这一命题的又一例证。

理论上来说，民主化必然伴随着对于民众更加广泛的动员，而把广大的民众维系在一个核心政治体的，必然就是这看不见摸不着的“民族主义情绪”。就算在当代的西方知识分子之中，这样的情绪也并没有完全消逝，相反还有复苏的趋向。在本次美国总统大选民主党初选中，奥巴马之所以在知识分子中间获得了广泛的支持，就是因为他把民主党的价值和爱国主义精神——这种已经和美国主流知识分子久违的情绪——成功地结合起来，让无数学院知识分子流下了热泪。

因此，无论从历史还是理论的角度来看，民族主义（国族主义）都是民主化不可避免的伙伴。长平先生崇尚自由，而这自由，当然包括少数人持有不同意见的自由。换句话说，是要照顾少数人的情绪。但是，当你连多数人的情绪都不承认都要教训的时候，你又怎么能够让这多数人再来照顾少数人的情绪呢？

也许有人会问：为了照顾少数人的情绪，难道不是应该通过打击多数人的情绪吗？在这样狭隘的思维中，隐含的是中国民主化真正的困境，那就是中产阶级在政治领导能力方面的匮乏。

民主化进程的成功，在现代国家的历史上，都需要一个最基本的条件：中产阶级需要有足够的能力和责任感来接管国家权力和民众的领导权。因此，中产阶级需要做好充足的政治准备，才能保证这个进程以成功而告终。中国民主化的荒唐之处在于，有许多人已经期待了十几年、二十几年，而多数人也知道，这一天迟早要来临，却没有人为此做有理性的政治准备。它就像一把达摩克里斯之剑，悬在我们上空，谁都知道它有一天会砸下来，人们或者焦急或者恐慌地期待着，却没人想过它砸下来时如何去接住它。

那么，中产阶级需要做什么样的政治准备呢？第一，要熟悉国策，熟悉如何管理国家事务；第二，要善于和民众沟通，照顾民众情绪；第三，要善于领导民众，保护个体、尤其是少数派的个体的自由。

现代国家是一台庞大的机器，有复杂的官僚结构，要负责数不胜数的经济、民生、军事和外交等事务。从国内的新兴媒体如《二十一世纪经济报道》、《新京报》、《南方周末》和《南方都市报》等对于国策的讨论逐渐深入和娴熟起来这一点来看，中产阶级在自我成长的过程中的确在熟悉国策方面正在取得一点点的进步。

然而，与国策方面的进步相对比的是，中产阶级在政治上的不成熟。这一点，在长平先生事件中表现得淋漓尽致。在现代国家中，中产阶级在天性上总是热爱自由的。这种天性来自于他们的职业性质。他们的劳动方式，决定了他们需要信息流通的自由、表达的自由和行动的自由。然而中国的中产阶级，却像长平先生一样，往往把他们对自由的热爱与民众的情绪对立起来，以为要有自由，要保护少数人保留不同意见的自由，就要否定多数人的情绪；他们把听取民众和听任民众等同起来；他们忘记了吸引民众支持与领导民众是一个辩证法，从而主动放弃了自己领导民众的责任，把它送还给了执政党。当他们要发出独立的政治声音时，他们就像被旧式知识分子附了体，变成了一副教训民众的腔调。他们还没有了解到，政治恰恰是创造可能性的艺术，是巧妙地保持有远见的国策、民众支持和个体自由三者间的平衡。

在这样的政治思维下，如果现有执政党出现危机、民主化进程突然启动的话，结果必然不是他们所期待的民主化，就连他们已有的一点自由都有可能会失去。法国大革命中，在废除封建制和国王专制中立下汗马功劳的中产阶级出身的吉伦特派，因为不能解决物价飞涨和食物短缺问题却又不能安抚民众的不安时，就开始教训起民众来，从而把民众的领导权让给了更加激进的山岳派，为后者把自己送上断头台铺平了道路。俄国革命中，孟什维克们同样因为身上那股俄国旧知识分子好为民师的积习，疏远了民众，把苏维埃的领导权让给了更加激进的布尔什维克，为自己被清洗出政治舞台制造了条件。伊朗革命中，当国王被迫宣布自由化时，中产阶级和知识分子们欣喜若狂，准备组阁接管权力，却发现自己并没有能力恢复秩序、安抚已经深受什叶派和霍梅尼影响的民众，于是甘愿忍受霍梅尼对他们的辱骂，试图利用他的影响力来领导民众，最终却发现霍梅尼夺走了他们手中所有的权力。他们推翻了一个国王的专制，却迎来了另一个带着头巾的“国王”的更加不自由的统治。

今天，在中产阶级达到领导能力与责任感的政治成熟之前，任何关于由执政党外力量接管国家权力的民主化期盼可能都是奢侈、甚至危险的。与其面对更加不可测的激进后果，人们宁愿选择接受继续接受执政党的统治：尽管不能获得充分的自由，但至少人们能够享有社会的稳定，以及或多或少的生活改善。

也许，就今天的中国现状而言，能够为民主化做好政治准备的，更有可能是执政党自身。这一道路所采取的方式，就是在执政党内部的竞争中部分力量被迫与中产阶级联合，开放政治自由，同时吸引民众支持，又维持强有力的国策能力。这大概也就是党内民主带动全社会民主的意涵所在吧。然而这一道路，我们在今天却很难预测得到。因为任何所谓改革派对保守派的思维方式，都是政治幼稚病一厢情愿的想法。迪斯累利的保守党所领导的民主改革和林肯的共和党所提倡的废奴运动，是无数反例中人们熟知的两个。这一过程是如此神秘，如此地不可测，我们无从知道它何时发生，怎样发生，是否会在现有秩序的稳定和繁荣耗尽之前发生。因此每当我们想起它，不过是另一把达摩克里斯之剑而已。然而，当中产阶级始终缺乏领导民众的勇气与责任感、始终害怕民众的“民族主义情绪”时，我们就只能忍受这达摩克里斯之剑的命悬之危了。

The international media coverage of riots in Tibet and neighboring regions has been highly controversial recently. CNN and various other media have been criticized by many as deceptive and manipulative in their dealing with facts, while their atribution of the riots to the unfreedom of Tibet have been acclaimed by others. This post is not intended to jump into this fray but rather to forge a cultural analysis of the role of Germany in particular and continental Europe in general in this representation battle.

As many have noticed, German media have been particularly one-sided and unbalanced this time in comparison with BBC, CNN and other major media in the Anglophone world. There has been tremendous exposure of the biasedness of German media so I don't want to reiterate the fact itself here. What puzzles many is: why are Germans so obssessed with this Tibet issue and so unanimous in support of the Free Tibet Movement without almost any independent and sober consideration of its political consequences? I have come up with a theory to explain this, which I think is interesting both theoretically and practically.

Any sensitive observer will be aware of the fact that many educated fellows in the West tend to look at the Tibet issue on the basis of an experience from their own history: the Jewish question (though they would seldom acknowledge it). There are many empirical reasons for why they draw such an analogy: Tibetans are portrayed as politically and socially underpriviledged pariahs in the new socio-economic situation in China just as Jews were in European societies; Tibetans are portrayed as a nation that have lost their home, just as Jews had lost their Jerusalem; Tibetans are portrayed as a nation that stick to their way of life and live a life that seems contradictory with the modern nation-state, just as the Orthodox Jews did, etc. Though I think it is not a really helpful analogy (for something good: Tibetans are not seen as anti-Christ in China; for something bad: they are not economically so powerful in China as the Jews were in Europe, etc.), that seems a handy thing for many Westerners to cling to. Indeed, I suspect even the Jews see the issue this way, as they are quite over-represented among the visitors to Dharamsala each year.

After drawing your attention to this analogy, now my theory begins to unfold. Since the contemporary German national identity has so much to do with their rememberance and repentance of their sin in anti-semitism and the Holocaust, the above analogy points out a unique opportunity for the Germans to redeem themsleves. This explains why they are so fervent in this representation battle. Otherwise their own salvation and spiritual regeneration would be in peril. Yet, ironically, this time they portray the Han Chinese as greedy and materialist without faith while Tibetans are understood as spiritual and pious with their everlasting faith in their Fuehrer--exactly the same way that they used to portray the Jews and themselves. So they, the protagnists, remain spiritual whereas their antagnists remain greedy and materialist. Hence, can we call this an "Inverse Nazism" or "Anti-Chinecism" (you must pronounce the term "-Chine-" in German, like "Chinesisch")?

Here I do not mean to offend any individual German but simply point out a sociological affinity out there. As a Weberian by heart, I do think the Germans as a nation always tend to overact politically. They tend to treat politics as morality, as religion, but seldom as politics itself. Since their Lutheran heritage sees individual as a vessel that waits for the divinity to fill in, they tend to believe that the world of God can be founded on this world, just like their Reich. They therefore tend to succumb to a black/white view of politics. The lack of self-discipline in their religion also makes them susceptible to unanimous emotional cotagions and crowd behaviors in which independent and balanced voices are overwhelmed. In general, they do lack the sober political wisdom and independent mind that are characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon peoples.

All that being said, I want to clarify that I do not intend to undermine the legitimacy of German concern with the Tibet issue itself. What I am doing here is simply sort out my own experience recently on a party, when a German and a Pole were whispering about Tibet on my back--literally--whereas moments later two Americans freely came up to me to ask what was my opinion on the issue. The difference was that the latter were interested in my voice whereas the former two refused to acknowledge my voice apparently simply because I am a Han Chinese and therefore must come from "the other side". This observation of mine speaks to the heart of my political philosophy of voice--you know what I mean, don't you?

2008：藏人暴动的政治意义

徐晓宏

2008年3月，拉萨。从第一个藏人捡起石块砸向平民商店、第一个藏人点燃火把烧向平民财物、第一个藏人伸出拳头挥向汉人平民的那一刻，至今为止西藏问题所累计的所有前提，其解决所面临的重重障碍，统统消散了。也就在这暴力迸发的一刻，西藏问题的新格局开始形成。中国政府与达赖喇嘛、世俗权力与神圣权威、暴力机器与和平抗争、铁碗的中国主权和高尚的藏独运动，这种种不可解的二元逻辑，被彻底打破了。西藏问题，将真正成为一个政治问题。一旦成为政治问题，我们终究可以找到政治的办法来解决。

从70年代末以来，达赖喇嘛及其藏独运动在国际上逐渐吸引了一大批的追随者。这个现象与趋势背后，有许多客观的历史背景。（1）在意识形态领域，60年代西方学生运动失败后的失落，使得许多左派走向对现代性的反动，就像他们的浪漫派祖先在十九世纪所做的那样。然而，十九世纪的浪漫派们尚能在他们自己国家的大众身上找到灵感；一个多世纪的历史变幻，已经使得他们在二十世纪的后继者们再也找不到本土的灵感。他们必须去那些异质的文明里面去寻找。而就此而言，西藏是地球上唯一一块似乎没有被西方现代性玷污的地方。它没有经历过本土的革命，没有战争，没有资本主义，没有吵闹的资产阶级民主，有的是不变的历史，不变的神圣统治，不变的虔诚的人们。西藏的存在本身，似乎就给了这群人无限的希望。（2）在文化、宗教与学术领域，多元化的深入，为达赖喇嘛在这些领域作为佛教代言人提供了制度性的基础。（3）在政治领域，卡特政府以来的人权政治、西德的和平攻势等变化，为达赖喇嘛打开了巨大的政治空间，使得他可以把藏独的诉求巧妙地嫁接到西方当代政治演进中去。比较而言，中共、中国政府、中国、中国人（在这个语境下，许多西方人往往认为这些词汇是可以相互置换的），却在这段时间的西方概念中经历了完全相反的位移。在意识形态领域，本来就面临冷战思维歧视的中国，在左翼学生运动衰落、文革结束、资本主义经济全面引入的背景下，在西方渐渐失去了最后的一批意识形态盟友。革命，资本主义，政治文明的欠开拓状态，这些都是西方现代性本有的经历，因此使得中国缺乏参与当代西方文化、宗教与学术领域的对话和讨论的切入点。迄今为止，中国主流的现代化思考，无论是民族国家的建构、革命的洗礼、自由经济的确立，还是当今的政治民主化，都是世俗化的走向；而晚近30年西方意识形态领域的去世俗化趋向，又从另一方面把中国的世俗化运动解读为不仅是世俗的，更是亵渎和污秽的。正是这些背景，使得西藏问题在国际上不能成其为一个政治问题，一个像北爱尔兰或者魁北克那样的政治问题，而是一个道德或者宗教问题。也正是在这些客观的历史背景之下，围绕着西藏问题形成了上述不可解的二元逻辑：达赖喇嘛的一方掌握了全部的道德、宗教和文化优势，而中国政府的一方却拥有全部的铁的权力。双方完全在不同的现实层面上作战。因此，达赖喇嘛与中国政府之间的谈判，由于双方都处在政治层面之外，注定不会有任何实质性的结果，这是因为，无论是道德，还是权力，根本上都是非政治的。这样的格局，如何能够解决一个归根到底要从政治层面解决的问题呢？

然而，2008年3月，从暴动藏人行使暴力的那一刻起，藏独非暴力的神话被打破。长久以来许多西方人认为独一无二的西藏问题，将在人们的概念中成为和北爱尔兰问题一样的政治问题。经济上的劣势、政治上的不平等、身份上的歧视、现代性与传统社会结构的碰撞，这些现代社会科学的概念和思考框架，将会被用来解释这个问题的存在和演进。正如铁路把西藏拉入现代资本主义秩序一样，暴力的抵抗把西藏问题推入了现代政治问题的范畴之内，同时也为它的政治解决打开了可能性的空间。那么，什么是它的政治解决呢？要回答这个问题，我们要进一步分析西藏问题的新格局。

暴动藏人的暴力，不仅从达赖喇嘛一方打破了固有的不可解的二元逻辑，更且因为它影响着许多正日渐积极参与政治的新社会阶层，将会使西藏问题在中国国内成为一个政治问题。当在藏地的汉人网友们传出他们亲历的暴动的消息时，这一进程已经启动。也正是这一进程，藏独作为一个选项，将被逐渐排除，西藏问题将被彻底纳入中国主权的框架下进行解决。新社会阶层中的许多人，毫无疑问将会坚持中国在西藏的主权，但会主张更加灵活变通的西藏政策。中国政治中对藏政策的争议和分化，必然激发新的政治合纵连横，因此打破“中国强权”与“西藏独立”在藏人中的二元逻辑。藏人精英将会出现与新对藏政策合流的趋向，出现在中国主权框架下解决西藏问题的强而有力的声音，就像爱尔兰人在英国历史上所做的那样。西藏问题因此会逐渐在中国政治的空间内得以解决。这一进程，当然将与中国内地政治文明的开拓紧密相关，也有待中国内地和藏人中的政治家和国民们的政治智慧才能实现。可以预见的是，在未来较短的时间内，中国政府的对藏政策会收紧，这是由于目前的政治焦点还在藏独和主权的问题上，在这一点上，中国政府有着广泛而强大的民意支持。但是当政治焦点逐渐落实到政策问题上时，争议、分化和合纵连横将会依次登台，长远的对藏政策将会日渐缓和，藏人将被逐渐统合和吸纳入中华民族的政治生活中。

从火车开入西藏的那一天起，西藏问题的旧框架——一出只有达赖喇嘛和中南海两个主角的国际非政治大戏——所赖以存在的物质基础已经倒塌了。眼下的西藏危机，本来在那一刻就应该可以预想得到。但它确实来得快，快得有点出乎意料。但我们也不必悲观，因为暴力的发生，已经把最棘手的问题解决了。留给我们这些汉藏民众的，就是一个真正的政治问题。这个问题需要争议和沟通，需要信任和妥协，需要智慧和策略。就在这个政治的空间里，我们将会再创我们50多年来的共和。

国家未来的对藏政策，将需要彻底的调整，而这一调整本身，将是中国政治文明开拓进程中的重要一环。目前就这一问题的思考，都停留在西藏自治权的层面。这个方案，表面上看去是处于不稳定的现状与不可欲的藏独之间，似乎因此可以作为谈判的中间路线。但是，这一自治的方案在现实中不仅没有制度基础，而且也不可能带来稳定。地区自治从根本上是法团主义的模式，它从原则上就是与现代国家的治理精神相悖的。它的制度前提是，国家的治理建立在法团的协商之上，而与隶属法团的个人无关，法团的首领能够为法团的政治行为负责任。但是在这一点上，一方面国家在西藏的治理已经完全超越法团的模式，而日渐趋向为个体为本的治理，另一方面，达赖喇嘛已经日渐表现出无力控制局面的情状。自治的模式，还由于它会带来自治的范围、权限等无穷尽的问题，将无法应对未来的政治变数，因此极端不稳定。从根本上来说，未来的解决方案，应该落实到每个藏人的个人权利之上。因此，问题不应该是西藏作为一个地区的自治权利，而是每一个藏人的个人权利。这些权利不仅包括宗教自由等基本的权利，不仅需要许多经济和社会政策倾斜的支持，更应该建立在他们作为中国公民所应享有的公民权，而其中最核心的，就是参与政治的权利。只有当每个藏人可以在国家的政治生活中有发言权的时候，这些权利才能在根本上得到巩固，也只有这样，西藏的旧制度才不会再威胁国家的统合、政治的稳定和普通藏人的权利。而这一点，显然将依赖于中国未来政治民主的发展和政治文明的开拓并构成其中重要的一环。换句话说，我们要以政治权利平等与自由为基础的社会和经济平等与自由，来瓦解藏独对于普通藏人的吸引力。表面上看，在目前的骚动中，僧侣与普通的暴动藏人有着同样的诉求，但实际上，僧侣所要求的是，西藏旧制度下他们所享有的特权；而驱动普通的暴动藏人的，是他们作为个体在新的经济社会情势下没有发言的权利。政治统合一旦赋予后者参与新格局的权利和机会，那么僧侣们也将不得不改变他们的主张，不再要求比作为中国公民更多的权利。因此，通过解决每一个藏人作为中国公民的个人权利问题，西藏问题将不复存在。要实现这个转变，就要仰赖汉藏政治家与公民们在新格局下展现的政治智慧了。